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This paper characterises rules-based fiscal policy setting. Basically, we translate a standard 
monetary policy rule into a simple fiscal policy rule. We then infer on fiscal policymakers' 
reaction coefficients by testing the rule with GMM. Interaction is also tested directly by the 
inclusion of monetary policy setting. Our results qualify existing evidence on systematic 
fiscal policy in two respects. First, fiscal policy usually stabilises public debt. And there is 
indeed substantial interaction between fiscal and monetary policy via the debt channel. 
Second, sustainability is achieved with a “stop-go” cycle of consolidation. Consolidation does 
not come at the cost of less cyclical stabilisation unless debt ratios are high. 
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The sustainability of public finances has once again come to the forefront of the policy 
agenda in the United States, Japan and the European Union. A brief look at the figures 
reveals that in recent years, debt ratios have been on the rise again (see Fig. 1). This 
comes somewhat as a surprise after rules-bound policies came into vogue in the nineties, 
on the tide of neo-classical thinking on long term stability policies. Even if the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act never officially applied, the Clinton administration nevertheless 
governed a substantial reduction of public debt. The EU governments enshrined public 
debt and deficit targets in the Treaty of Maastricht, and strengthened these provisions in 
the Stability and Growth Pact (henceforth SGP). The rules of the Pact comprise the use 
of automatic stabilisers around structural fiscal positions that are close to balance or in 
surplus in the medium term. Fiscal rules have thus become a way to think about 
systematic fiscal policy, both in academic and policy debates. 
 
Newspaper articles rarely discuss budget decisions without reference to the complete 
policy stance. Even few economists would disregard the policy mix in a colloquial 
analysis. For the USA, the fiscal expansion of the Bush administration is rarely 
mentioned without accompanying loose Federal Reserve policy. The impotence of 
Japanese monetary policy over the last decade has repeatedly given rise to calls for 
fiscal expansion. And the gradual dismantling of the SGP reveals some tension on the 
right policy balance in a heterogeneous monetary union. At the same time, central 
bankers seem to take special interest in taming fiscal profligacy.
3 This may be part of the 
policy game, in which the fiscal or monetary authority tries to manoeuvre policy settings 
in its favour. But central bankers may also be aware of the constraints that 
unsustainability of public finances imposes on monetary policy in the longer term. 
 
Despite recent theoretical advances, an empirical analysis of joint systematic policy 
behaviour is currently missing. Monetary Taylor rules that express the setting of the 
interest rate as a reaction function of inflation and output have enjoyed enormous 
empirical interest. But the different nature of fiscal policy has impeded a straightforward 
                                                 
3 “Greenspan Urges Reinstating Budget Rules” AP 12/02/04; “Trichet wirbt für den Stabilitätspakt”, 
FAZ 21/11/03.   3
extension,
 4 even though estimates of fiscal policy rules are implicit in diverse strands of 
the empirical literature. Many of these papers are confined to an analysis of the 
government budget's cyclical properties, and ignore the composition of the budget or the 
trade-off with debt stabilisation. The effects of monetary policy are assumed to be non-
existent. Usually, the important feedback effects of fiscal policy on output are not taken 
into account. 
 
The principal objective of this paper is to analyse fiscal instrument rules empirically. In 
Section 2, we discuss recent developments in the theoretical literature on systematic 
fiscal policy. This concise overview points at similarities and differences with rules-based 
monetary policy, and provides the basic arguments for the derivation of empirical fiscal 
policy rules. Specification and methodology are likewise adjusted in Section 3, and 
contains the two major contributions of this paper. First, we closely follow Clarida et al. 
(1998) in presenting a fiscal rule in which the policy instrument is gradually adjusted to 
its target level. However, policy interaction makes the specification differ somewhat from 
the existing literature. This concerns in the first place the reaction to public debt. Not only 
does this provide a test for solvency à la Bohn (1998). Debt sustainability may have 
important spillovers on monetary policy as well. Conversely, we allow monetary policy 
setting to influence fiscal policy directly and this may be considered a test for policy 
interaction. For the same reason, we estimate fiscal rules under different regimes. I.e., 
we contrast evidence for G-3 countries (Germany, Japan and United States) with a 
sample of former EMS countries. The argument is that the differences in monetary policy 
regime may have induced different fiscal reactions. We also explicitly model policy shifts 
as we search for a structural break in the reaction coefficients. Second, our methodology 
consists in estimating the non-linear policy rule with GMM. As such, we correct for policy 
endogeneity in determining output and inflation. Moreover, the intertemporal character of 
fiscal policy is thereby respected. The results - discussed in Section 4 - reveal that there 
are diverse channels through which fiscal and monetary policies interact. We show fiscal 
policy is concerned about debt sustainability, but that this objective does not necessarily 
enter the fiscal authorities' rule in a stable way. Consolidation comes at the cost of
                                                 
4First, fiscal policy is - unlike monetary policy - subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. 
Second, fiscal instruments are inherently heterogeneous, both in its setting (composition of 
revenues versus expenditures) and in its effects on agents. The latter also adds a distinct political 
flavour. Third, potential channels of interaction between monetary and fiscal policy need to be 
taken into account, whereby the intertemporal government budget constraint again plays a crucial 
role.   4
Figure 1. General government debt ratio to GDP (%). 
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  reduced cyclical stabilisation only if debt had clearly derailed before. An extensive 
robustness analysis, both in methodology and specification confirm these insights. 
Conclusions follow in Section 5. 
 
2.  POLICY RULES: A FISCAL POLICY PERSPECTIVE 
 
2.1. Monetary versus fiscal policy rules 
   6
Since Taylor's (1993) proposal for a simple rule for setting interest rates, the theoretical 
and empirical analysis of monetary policy rules has become a true industry of research. 
The leitmotiv of this analysis is the validity of the Taylor principle, by which central banks 
should not accommodate changes in the price level. We only highlight here the omission 
of any interaction with fiscal policy: the derivation of results usually proceeds under the 
Ricardian assumption that fiscal policy setting is irrelevant. 
 
The discussion of fiscal policy rules has mostly been normative, and limited to simple 
rules with practical policy implications. Proposals of balanced budget rules, a golden rule, 
deficit or debt target values, … have been discussed extensively in the literature 
criticising the SGP, for example. However, there is no comprehensive framework to 
analyse fiscal policy rules. And not much more research has been devoted to its 
empirical examination. As a consequence, some of the terminology by which fiscal policy 
will be characterised needs to be clarified. By definition, we can decompose
5 the overall 
indicator st of fiscal stance
6 into a structural - or cyclically adjusted ss,t   - and a cyclical 
part αyt as in (1): 
t t s t y s s α − ≡ , ,     (1) 
with α the elasticity of the fiscal indicator with respect to output. Using either of these two 
indicators, we can attribute fiscal policy to discretionary policy or automatic stabilisers 
respectively. With an econometric approach, in contrast, we express the indicator st as 
some function f(•) of cyclical  (yt)  and exogenous variables (Xt,) as in (2): 
 
t t t t X y f s ε ξ + = ) ; , ( ,       ( 2 )  
 
We associate systematic fiscal policy with both automatic stabilisers and the cyclical 
reactions of discretionary policy, conditional upon the reaction to the exogenous 
variables Xt, and subject to a possible policy shift ξ . The non-systematic part then is the 
true "policy shock" (εt) and reflects a kind of filtered measure of discretionary policy. 
 
                                                 
5A variety of heuristic detrending methodologies are used to calculate the structural deficit. The 
OECD estimates the elasticities α for different budget categories and relates these to the output 
gap. Others apply a filter to the actual indicator st directly. 
6It is irrelevant for the specification whether this indicator is a deficit or a surplus, but the notation 
in terms of surpluses is more common in the literature.   7
Few papers test fiscal policy rules as such. Much of the analysis is limited to the cyclical 
sensitivity of some fiscal policy indicator. Taylor (2000) himself suggests and estimates 
simple rules for the USA by regressing the structural and the cyclical surplus on the 
output gap. His results indicate a procyclical elasticity of 0.45 in the total surplus, mainly 
provided by the automatic stabilisers. However, Auerbach (2002) finds a somewhat 
stronger systematic response of discretionary policy to the cycle, including reactions to 
fiscal imbalances over the last decade. Favero and Monacelli (2003) estimate a Markov-
switching model of an inertial rule and include debt stabilisation as well. Fiscal policy is 
found to be countercyclical and debt stabilising over the whole sample. Other studies 
assess cyclical properties of fiscal policy in a European or OECD sample, either on a 
country-by-country or panel basis. Fatas and Mihov (2001) relate growth ratios of 
different fiscal variables to output growth. Panel estimates show that the primary deficit 
ratio is slightly countercyclical. Fatas and Mihov (2003) also examine non-systematic 
policy setting in the EU, after controlling the overall surplus for an even larger set of 
cyclical variables - also including monetary variables. The endogenous component of 
policy seems to become more important in explaining fiscal policy variability.
7 
 
There is a strong argument for shifts in fiscal policy regimes. A whole range of ad hoc 
breakdates has been suggested in the literature. The narrative SVAR studies on the 
effects of fiscal policy suggest major defence spending increases as the Korean and 
Vietnam War to identify fiscal shocks. Taylor (2000) includes a 1984-dummy for the 
Reagan administration in his rule. A common turning point for European fiscal 
policymakers is the Treaty of Maastricht (Wyplosz, 2002; Galí and Perotti, 2003). Only 
Favero and Monacelli (2003) model different policy regimes explicitly and argue that 
USA fiscal policy was undisciplined before 1987. 
 
The results of these papers do not have any structural interpretation, however, and 
                                                 
7 The empirical analysis of fiscal policy implicitly contains a rule of the type in (2). Arreaza et al. 
(1999) examine the various channels of income smoothing on the basis of the different categories 
of national income. In a panel of OECD and EU countries, countercyclical government 
consumption and transfers can account for up to one third of income smoothing. These effects 
are largely symmetric over the cycle, with transfers being much more significant in recessions. No 
trade-off with debt is apparent. The assessment of fiscal policy is also related to the literature on 
income smoothing and inter/intranational risk sharing. Another strand relates government size to 
output volatility. These papers obtain estimates of budget elasticities by examining changes in 
government size. According to Hercowitz and Strawczynski (1999), the combined effect of 
acyclical deficits during booms and deficitary reactions in recessions is responsible for the rise in 
the government spending ratio in OECD countries.   8
cannot characterise systematic policy behaviour. Not only do cyclical fluctuations explain 
an important part of the variation in the fiscal variable because of the workings of the 
automatic stabilisers. Except under the hypothesis of Ricardian equivalence, these 
fluctuations may be determined by the fiscal variable too. This suggests instrumental 
estimation to correct for the endogeneity of output. The following studies correctly label 
their reaction function estimates as fiscal rules then. Lane (2003) examines cyclical 
properties of different components of the government budget. The regression of these 
categories on output growth shows that cyclicality varies substantially across categories 
and countries. Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2003) estimate non-linear fiscal policy 
rules for EU countries. Fiscal policy is countercyclical and debt stabilising. Galí and 
Perotti (2003) estimate systematic discretionary policy in EMU countries before and after 
the introduction of the Maastricht rules, but do not find evidence of reduced 
countercyclical reactions. 
 
2.2. Debt sustainability: the nexus of policy interaction 
 
The debate spurred by the dispute on the fiscal theory of the price level (henceforth 
FTPL) has led to a reconsideration of the channels of interaction between fiscal and 
monetary policy.
8 It has once more placed the focus on fiscal sustainability and on the 
policy mix in determining macroeconomic outcomes. Basically, the argument of the 
FTPL hinges on the interpretation of the intertemporal government budget constraint 
(henceforth IGBC) as a value equation rather than as a constraint. Ultimately, the 
responsibility for the price level is in the hands of the fiscal authority then. If fiscal policy 
is sufficiently reactive to debt, then the IGBC will be satisfied for all price paths. Monetary 
policy retains the ability to control prices in this Ricardian environment. However, if an 
exogenous process determines fiscal policy, it will select the price path for the economy. 
 
This has two major implications for policy rules. First, the main finding is that optimal 
monetary policy rules need not conform to the standard properties anymore. In particular, 
under non-Ricardian regimes the properties of policy rules need to be reversed to ensure 
determinacy. Second, if the IGBC is not a constraint, then models of fiscal policy need to 
be closed in very much the same way as models of monetary policy are closed. I.e., with 
                                                 
8 The FTPL is still highly controversial between proponents (Cochrane, 1998; Woodford, 2001) 
and contenders (Buiter, 1999).   9
a fiscal rule that expresses the surplus as a function of debt Dt, as in (3), 
 
t t t D s χ θ + = ,    (3) 
 
and where θ = 0 would imply a non-Ricardian policy.  
 
The empirical examination of the relevance of policy interaction is still at an infant stage. 
The main reason is that the main contention of the FTPL literature is not directly testable. 
There are no identifying restrictions that allow distinguishing the IGBC as a value 
equation or as a constraint, for this equilibrium relation necessarily holds.
 9  This casts 
doubt on the validity of direct tests for solvency on this relation. This analysis is typically 
limited to univariate tests on the properties of debt, or a cointegration analysis of 
government revenue and expenditure. 
 
There are nevertheless direct testable restrictions on the policy rules. In first instance, 
this relates to the sign and magnitude of the reaction coefficients in monetary and fiscal 
rules. Of more importance for the fiscal rule is the reaction of the fiscal surplus to public 
debt. Bohn (1998) - although driven by other motivations than testing the FTPL - proofs 
that a positive reaction of the primary surplus to the (initial) debt to GDP ratio (θ>0), is a 
robust sufficient condition for fiscal solvency.
10 In the empirical counterpart to (3), Bohn 
(1998) relates the primary surplus to debt, and models  t χ  by conditioning on permanent 
and cyclical components of fiscal policy. In the FTPL context, the test on the significance 
of the debt reaction may give us an idea of the independence of monetary policy. 
However, these short term reactions may not be distinguishable as FTPL reactions in the 
longer term (Canzoneri et al., 2002). 
 
Clearly, it is somewhat inappropriate to infer on fiscal or monetary policy rules in 
isolation.
11 One strategy is to simultaneously estimate a system of fiscal and monetary 
                                                 
9 For some attempts to test the FTPL, see Cochrane (1998), Canzoneri et al. (2001), Woodford 
(2001) and Sala (2004). 
10 Under the additional assumptions that the process is stationary and ergodic, and that  t χ  is 
bounded as a share of GDP. 
11 Other strategies are still based on univariate analyses of fiscal policy. Favero and Monacelli 
(2003) add a fiscal rule to a VAR-augmented Taylor rule. This results in an improved fit for 
inflation in periods of fiscal indiscipline. Conversely, Galí and Perotti (2003) insert a monetary   10
reaction functions. Both policies are set in function of cyclical conditions and policy 
interaction is introduced by mutual inclusion of the other policy instrument. Mélitz (2000) 
estimates such a system and concludes for a pool of 19 OECD countries that automatic 
stabilisation is much weaker than what previous studies find (elasticity of only 0.1). Debt 
dynamics are kept under control. There is also evidence of policy substitutability: fiscal 
and monetary policies tend to offset each other. Wyplosz (1999) includes some 
additional explanatory variables but results for the panel of EMU countries are very much 
alike. Nevertheless, while the European central banks react in the standard Taylor rule 
way to inflation and the output gap, no reaction to fiscal policy is detected as such. 
Conversely, fiscal policy is a strategic substitute to monetary policy, albeit the effect is 
small. Von Hagen et al. (2001) look into the pre-EMU fiscal consolidations, and estimate 
a small model consisting of fiscal rules and output growth. Fiscal policy again tends to 
relax when monetary policy tightens, while monetary policy is set as a complement. 
Favero (2002) constructs a small structural model. A system of equations for inflation, 
the output gap, the policy reaction functions and debt interest payments is set up. 
Identifying restrictions are imposed in order to separate systematic from non-systematic 
policies. The SUR-estimation of this system for the 4 large EMU-countries confirms prior 
evidence on fiscal policy behaviour: (a) systematic stabilisation effects are small as a 
combination of countercyclical revenues and procyclical expenditures, (b) fiscal policy 
always reacts in a stabilising way to debt rises, be it through lower expenditures or 
increased revenues; and (c) the interest rate channel on interest payment burden is 
important. Besides, deviations by fiscal authorities from systematic behaviour do not 




This paper is a bit diverse and more limited in scope than the latter studies. We closely 
follow Clarida et al. (1998) in presenting the empirical specification of a fiscal policy rule. 
This “rule” approach provides a sufficient solvency test on public debt, while being 
completely consistent with theoretical models of fiscal policy. I.e., the empirical model 
                                                                                                                                                   
policy shock into their fiscal rule and find that fiscal policy is a significant yet unimportant 
substitute to monetary policy. Another - more informal - way to assess policy interaction is based 
on a descriptive correlation analysis of both fiscal and monetary policy shocks, either within or 
between countries. See Bruneau and DeBandt (2003) for evidence in the SVAR context, or 
Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2003) in the policy rule literature.   11
conditions upon cyclical responses and policy interaction. This specification then gives a 
testable condition that allows using a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) procedure 
to identify the reaction coefficients. 
 
3.1. The fiscal policy rule 
 




, y y s s
t e
n t t − + = +
∗ γ .    (4) 
 
The fiscal policy maker sets the target instrument st
  at time t in response to expected 
output deviations from target. Here, the constant s  represents a long term equilibrium 
level (e.g. at golden rule level), 
e
n t t y + ,  is the expectation at time t of the future output level 
some n periods ahead, and  y ˆ  is the target output level of the fiscal authority. 
 
A more general fiscal policy reaction function may be modelled along the arguments of 
Benigno and Woodford (2003), as follows: 
 
) ˆ ( ) ˆ (




n t t y y s s .    (5) 
 
The inclusion of a response to inflation deviations from target may seem rather peculiar.
 
12,13 Such an instrument rule may be optimal once allowing for interaction with monetary 
policy. Benigno and Woodford (2003) characterise time-invariant optimal monetary and 
fiscal policy targeting rules, the commitment to which implements the welfare-maximising 
equilibrium. Both policymakers intend to minimise the distortions by stabilising inflation 
(around zero) and the output gap that results from both distortionary taxes and sticky 
                                                 
12 With this formulation, 
e
k t t + , π  is the expectation at time t of the future inflation rate k periods 
ahead, and π ˆ  is the target inflation rate of the fiscal authority. 
13The coefficients γ  and  β   are functions of the reaction coefficients to demand and supply 
shocks from an optimal instrument rule. Such a linear reaction function arises as a reduced form 
of an optimal policy rule derived from - and robust to several specifications of - a central bank's 
(quadratic) loss function over inflation and output, subject to a (linear) Phillips curve economy.   12
prices. With two policy instruments and two targets, many joint policy settings are 
possible. Under the dual assumption that the central bank takes the evolution of public 
debt as given, whereas fiscal policy leaves output determination to the central bank, a 
target rule for inflation and debt can be derived. As instrument or target rules are 
equivalent representations of optimal policy, we choose to specify a fiscal rule in terms of 
the underlying policy variables, output gap and inflation. Another argument for inflation 
stabilisation has its roots in the OCA literature and is highly relevant to monetary union. 
With asymmetric shocks or diverging inflation preferences, national fiscal policy makers 
may assume the role of monetary policy in stabilising inflation.
14 
 
Applying the definition equation (1) and the assumption that the government sets its 
fiscal instrument consistent with its output level target, we then obtain the structural 
instrument target of the fiscal authorities, which comprises a structural long term part  s s  
and a cyclical part such that 
 
). ˆ ( ) ˆ )( (
, ,




n t s t s y y s s     (6) 
 
The baseline specification (6) need be augmented with two more factors of policy 
interaction. In first instance, we want to account for monetary policy setting. The 
monetary instrument i is directly plugged into the rule in an ad hoc way. This goes 
beyond the inclusion of a term responding to variations in the interest saved on the 
monetary base, as the literature on dynamically optimal fiscal policy would suggest.
15 
Indirectly, as both policymakers pursue the same targets, there must be important 
reactions of systematic monetary policy on fiscal policy setting. As the rule already 
conditions on cyclical and inflation variability, and the estimation procedure controls for 
systematic policy,
 16 we consider it to be a direct test of policy interaction. 
                                                 
14 Further reasons for fiscal reactions to inflation are the non-indexation of tax brackets and the 
Olivera-Tanzi effect. These effects are not expected to determine real tax revenues in 
industrialised economies featuring low to moderate inflation however. 
15 Seigniorage is unlikely to matter for the validity of the conclusions anyhow (Woodford, 2001). 
16 It is an incomplete way of controlling for systematic policy though. We would need a complete 
model of systematic policy being appended to this model. An extension to system estimation of a 
fiscal and monetary rule may be considered. The economic arguments for a system approach 
have strong theoretical foundations. As shocks in both policies are likely to be 
contemporaneously correlated (Favero, 2002), joint estimation would allow a more precise 
estimation of systematic policy reaction coefficients. Data limitations urge us to estimate the fiscal 
rule only.   13
 
In addition, interaction concerns fiscal solvency. Fiscal rules that include a reaction to the 
public debt ratio are a means of closing models of fiscal policy and provide a test of fiscal 
sustainability. This approach complements the approach of Bohn (1998) as we model 
explicitly the  t χ  term, and identify it as a “fiscal rule”.
17 Some measure of government 
debt Dt is therefore included. 
 
It has been argued in the monetary policy rule literature that interest rate smoothing is a 
realistic description of central bank behaviour. Persistence in a fiscal reaction function 
seems more natural as the budgetary process involves lengthy parliamentary processes 
and sunk decisions. The fiscal instrument thus adjusts only gradually to its target level: 
 
t t t t s s s µ ρ ρ + − + =
∗
− ) 1 ( 1 ,    (7) 
 
with  1 0 ≤ ≤ ρ   the degree of persistence. Introducing smoothing and augmenting the 
target indicator gives us the following empirical specification: 
 
[] t t t k t n t t t D i x s s ε θ ω βπ γ δ ρ ρ + + + + + − + = + + − ) 1 ( 1 .   (8) 
 
In this rule, δ equals  π β γ ˆ *) ˆ ( − − − y y ss  and represents the long term fiscal indicator 
adjusted for inflation and the deviation between the government’s output target and 
potential output  * y . The output gap is given by  * y y x t n t − = + . The error term in (8) is 
composed of an exogenous i.i.d. disturbance representing shocks to fiscal policy and the 
forecast error on output and inflation.
18 
 
Let us now assume that the fiscal instrument is the actual surplus ratio. Key interest 
usually focuses on γ, which reflects the systematic cyclical properties of fiscal policy. If 
systematic fiscal policy just "lets the automatic stabilisers work", then γ=α and the 
structural deficit  s s   is constant at its long term level  s s , ceteris paribus. A positive 
                                                 
17 Ignoring the modelling of these components risks creating omitted variable problems, at least if 
not both s and D are non-stationary, in which case estimates would be super-consistent. 
18 That is,  ). ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 (
, , t e
k t k t
t e
n t n t t t x x + + + + − − − − − − ≡ π π β ρ γ ρ µ ε    14
coefficient  0 > −α γ   indicates additional discretionary intervention, while  0 < −α γ  
procyclically magnifies the gap. The important caveat in the further analysis is that only 
systematic policy behaviour can be detected. New to the analysis is that we can test the 
significance of inflation as an independent policy target for fiscal policy.
19 
Debt sustainability has commonly been inferred from a positive coefficient θ , without 
specifying the magnitude. It is also a sufficient condition for fiscal policy to be considered 
Ricardian. We have also isolated the direct interaction between policy authorities.
20 In 
FTPL-terminology, a significant systematic response implies policy is non-autonomous: 




Under rational expectations, shocks to systematic policy behaviour should be unrelated 
to external information at time t. Let  t z  be a vector of variables that contain this external 
information, then equation (8) defines a set of orthogonality conditions 
 
{} [] 0 ) )( 1 ( 1 = + + + + − − − + + − t t t k t n t t t z D i x s s θ ω βπ γ δ ρ ρ ,   (9) 
 
that imposes a testable condition such that the policy rule can be estimated with GMM. 
As such, we correct for the endogeneity problem referred to above. If systematic policy 
has indeed real effects, then the output gap and inflation will be correlated with the error 
terms in the policy rule. Applying OLS leads to biased and inconsistent estimates and 
the degree of stabilisation would thus be overestimated consequently. In addition, the 
instruments capture to some extent the systematic part of monetary policy. GMM 
estimation suffers from different flaws, however (Fuhrer and Rudebusch, 2002). First, 
instrumental variables may be potentially weak. We test the validity of the overidentifying 
restrictions through the J-test. The interpretation of the J-test also provides a neat way to 
assess the importance of the additional policy targets we include in the rule. In particular, 
when the overidentifying restrictions are valid, policy makers react systematically to all 
relevant and available information. But rejection of this null means explanatory variables 
                                                 
19 Even if the sign of the fiscal policy response is unclear a priori. 
20 The problem of identifying equilibrium responses of reaction functions is solved by the GMM 
methodology.   15
have been omitted, leading to a violation of the orthogonality conditions. We therefore 
compute the J-test with the explanatory variables
21  included among the instrumental 
variables instead of in the systematic reaction function. As the J-test does not consider a 
specific alternative, it is likely to have low power. We therefore compute in addition an F-
test on the first stage regression. A second problem of GMM relates to the non-linearity 
of the policy rule. We control in particular for residual autocorrelation.
22 A more serious 
problem is the sensitivity of GMM to the normalisation imposed upon the orthogonality 
conditions. Estimations are therefore run on alternative rephrasings of specification (9).
23 
In Section 4.2, we discuss some other robustness checks too.
24 
 
The rules approach is somehow subject to criticism on the ad hoc identifying restrictions. 
Even if the basic specification of the fiscal rule may be derived from a consistent 
theoretical framework, the timing of policy reactions need be based on the practical 
ability to adjust policy. The budget is usually set on an annual basis, even if within-the-
year adjustments are not uncommon. However, as the fiscal impact of output runs 
mainly through automatic stabilisers, we include the contemporaneous output gap (n=0). 
Our choice of contemporaneous inflation is motivated by its tax effect on fiscal receipts 
and debt deflation (k=0). Also, we choose to lag the measure of debt by one period, 
even if this may be too rapid if unsustainability is not immediately apparent. Even more 
challenging is the timing of the interaction term. Theoretical models provide little 
guidance as strategic interaction between policymakers mostly evolves as a stage game, 
where either fiscal or monetary policy is assumed to have a first-mover advantage. We 
proceed under a practical assumption on the nature of the policy game: fiscal policy is 
infrequently set whereas monetary policy is a swing variable that may anticipate fiscal 
actions instantaneously. Under such regime, reactions to the central bank rate are 
backward-looking. 
 
                                                 
21 These include in particular inflation and the interaction term. 
22 The disturbances have an MA-representation. GMM-estimates are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and MA(4) autocorrelation. 
23 As the results are nearly identical, this is not further discussed. 
24There are two other problems with moments estimators that we can discard. First, the policy 
rule may not provide a fully correct moment condition. Second, binding constraints on the 
optimisation problem underlying the derivation of the fiscal rule, may blur estimation results. The 
deficit ceilings may indeed have constrained policy makers.   16
The estimation procedure is conducted as follows.
25  In first instance, the non-linear 
policy rule is estimated with OLS. These initial coefficient estimates are then used as 
starting values for 2SLS estimation of the reaction function, with a sufficient number of 
instrumental variables. An optimal weighting matrix is constructed to start off the iteration 
procedure for GMM. Perturbation of the initial estimates - and especially those of the 




Henceforth, we consider the primary surplus ratio to potential output as the fiscal 
instrument. This choice is a logical consequence of our specification of the fiscal policy 
rule. First, the distinction between discretionary and cyclical fiscal policy is of minor 
importance at this point, as we want to characterise aggregate fiscal policy setting. As 
neither structural deficit nor automatic stabilisers are directly observable, we also avoid 
contentious choices on the method of cyclical adjustment. Second, a spurious 
relationship between the overall deficit and monetary policy may arise if a monetary 
tightening - resulting in higher interest payments - induces compensations in other 
components of the budget. The primary category corrects for this effect. Third, actual 
output is endogenous with respect to the policy instrument. Potential GDP filters out this 
effect. As the interaction variable, we use the monetary policy instrument which by 
standard choice in the literature, is a nominal short-term interest rate directly influenced 
by the central bank.
26 The policy target variables are taken to be CPI inflation and a 
simple mechanical output gap measure. On the basis of the IGBC, one would argue for a 
reaction to the debt ratio. However, from the literature on non-Keynesian effects of fiscal 
consolidations, we know that reactions of fiscal policy makers may be highly non-linear. 
Consequently, we examine different indicators of debt. In order to implement GMM, we 
need a set of instrumental variables. In order to avoid potential estimation bias in small 
samples, only a small number of overidentifying restrictions is imposed. The basic set 
                                                 
25  We proceed under the assumption that all variables in the policy rules are stationary. 
Appropriate data transformations are applied to that end, but the unit root hypothesis cannot 
always be rejected. By construction, the output gap satisfies this assumption, yet for some of the 
main variables (the fiscal indicator and the debt ratio in particular), the ADF test does not always 
reject a unit root and the KPSS confirms this. These results may suffer from the relatively short 
sample length during which only a few large swings in fiscal policy are evident. 
26This instrument of the Bundesbank is also the relevant foreign interest rate in countries that 
fixed the exchange rate.   17
includes a single lag of the policy instrument and the target variables. In addition, 
domestic and international monetary conditions
27 are used, as are supply side factors.
28 
 
Data availability on government accounts dictates the data frequency and the sample of 
countries included. All data come from the OECD Economic Outlook and are on an 
annual basis (see Table 1). Monetary policy decisions are taken at a much higher 
frequency. But given a high degree of interest rate smoothing, this measure is probably 
not too coarse. Fiscal policy is set at an annual frequency, even if discretionary in-year 
revisions are not unusual. The countries in the sample can be divided in two main 
groups: (a) the G-3 countries: United States, Japan and Germany; and (b) the EMS 
countries: France, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, The Netherlands and Austria. 
 
A first look at the policy instruments and the objectives of both authorities in these 
countries (see Figs. 2), shows two major facts for fiscal policy. First, prolonged periods of 
primary deficits and surpluses occurred with no obvious cyclical reversals in the 
European countries and Japan. In contrast, a nearly perfectly synchronised relationship 
exists in the USA. Second, the nineties have been characterised by much more 
persistent behaviour. With the exception of Germany, it seems that the Maastricht 
conditions led to reductions in the primary deficit in the European countries, and 
especially so after 1995 (Fatas and Mihov, 2003). A similar fall is apparent in the United 
States, but seems to be strongly related to the extraordinary growth over the same 
period. Exactly the opposite evolution occurred in Japan. With regard to monetary policy, 
we get the "Volcker-Greenspan" observation. Pre-1980 central bank policy was 
accommodative in all countries in the sample. Since, anti-inflationary monetary policy 
has set short-term interest rates constantly above inflation, implying positive ex post real 
interest rates. Such comovement is less apparent for France in the hard ERM period 
(1988-1992) and in the Netherlands, which continuously maintained a hard peg to the 
DEM in the EMS. Another eye-ball observation is that after the initial disinflationary 
period, interest rates seem to have become more responsive to the output gap. 
 
                                                 
27 These include a single lag of a broad money aggregate, a commodity price index, the yield, a 
foreign interest rate and the exchange rate to the DEM or the USD. 
28 Either lagged NAIRU or unit labour cost.   18
Table 1. Data sources 
Series Source 
primary surplus ratio (% of potential output) 
= revenues - expenditure + (capital transfers received by government + 
other capital transfers - income property paid by government + income 
property received by government + consumption of government fixed 
capital) 
revenue (real) = 
= social security transfers received by government + direct taxes + 
indirect taxes + transfers received by government 
expenditure (real)
 (a) = 
government consumption (non- wage) + government consumption 
(wage) + government gross investment + transfers 
transfers (real) = 
subsidies + social security transfers + other transfers paid by 
government 
structural primary deficit ratio (% of potential output) 
general government debt (% of potential output) 
CPI 
public consumption deflator 
GDP deflator 
short term interest rate (central bank rate) 
output gap (%) 
interest payments 
GDP and potential output 
unit labour cost 
NAWRU 
OECD EO no. 74 
exchange rate (to USD or DEM)  IMF / IFS 
commodity price index  CRB 
money stock  IMF / IFS 
Note: (a) real expenditure is derived by deflating public consumption with the 
corresponding deflator other components are deflated with the GDP deflator.   19
Figure 2. Data: primary surplus ratio versus output gap, and interest rates versus inflation: 
breakdate for fiscal policy indicated (see Table 4). 
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4. EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
 
The following paragraphs give a structural interpretation to the fiscal policy rule, compare 
these results with existing evidence, and check for their robustness. We focus in 
particular on fiscal sustainability and the effects of policy interaction. Results are 
displayed in Table 2. 
 
4.1. Baseline results 
 
4.1.1.  Fiscal sustainability and systematic policy responses: a good model? 
 
There is no unequivocal debt stabilisation response of fiscal policy. The effect is 
significant in the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Austria. 
In these countries, fiscal policies are sustainable and can be called Ricardian. The 
magnitude of the response is on the lower side of what Bohn (1998) finds for the United 
States. The reaction coefficient is much higher in Italy and the United Kingdom; however.   21
The absence of debt stabilisation for Japan, Germany, France and Spain is puzzling and 
not in line with existing evidence (Favero, 2002). The rejection of solvency does not 
imply fiscal policies are necessarily unsustainable, however. For that reason, we check 
whether the specification of a fiscal rule as the  t χ  term in (3) provides a good model to 
test sustainability. 
 
This relates in the first place to the cyclical stabilisation properties of fiscal policy.
29 The 
reaction coefficients show policy to be °leaning against the wind° in the United States, 
Japan and the smallest EMS members only. For most European countries, policy is 
indeed acyclical.
 30  This is in line with eye-ball evidence and suggests that discretionary 
fiscal interventions affect importantly the automatic stabilisation response.  
 
4.1.2.  Fiscal sustainability and policy interaction 
 
Taming inflation seems not to have been an important separate concern for fiscal 
authorities. And there is also no significant evidence of policy being non-autonomous. 
However, both policy targets are important in both long-standing EMS members, Austria 
and the Netherlands. Fiscal policy is set as a substitute to monetary policy. An interest 
rate hike of 1% would loosen fiscal policy by about 30 pp. Similarly, deviations of inflation 
from target induce a fiscal tightening in both countries. The budget process shifts to 
target inflation and cyclical stabilisation in order to offset the constraint of monetary 
policy dependence under EMS. This does not seem to affect debt nor output stabilisation 
reactions. 
 
This does not imply inflation or interest rates are less important in the other countries’ 
fiscal policy setting. With the exception of Japan, Germany and France, neither of the 
variables is rejected to matter as elements of the rule. But imposing the restriction that 
fiscal policy reacts to the real interest rate is not valid. It is not rejected for Italy, Austria 
                                                 
29 The policy persistence parameter displays some interesting patterns too. We would expect 
fiscal persistence to be high, and we find an adjustment to target of between one and two thirds 
on a yearly basis. This is not much stronger than monetary smoothing. Even at this data 
frequency, the budget process is not too slow. 
30 The reaction coefficient is very diverse and not consistent with the usual elasticity of automatic 
stabilisation, even if a Wald-test for this coefficient equalling 0.50 is hardly rejected.   22
and the Netherlands though. As a further check on the importance of the monetary 
variables, we reestimate the rules with the cyclical and debt variable only. This clearly is 
an incomplete model. Debt reactions are always positive, but significant in Italy only. The 
cyclical reaction is hardly significant either. Modelling policy interaction is thus an 
important element in recovering significant debt feedback. The joint significance of 
monetary variables and debt is only rejected in Germany and France. Our argument is 
that by conditioning for monetary policy behaviour, we have modelled an important 
component of fiscal policy setting that complements fiscal feed-back effects. I.e., it 
alleviates to a large extent the pressure of debt on current fiscal policy setting. Price 
level variations deflate the real payoffs on nominally-denominated government debt. 
Even if the Olivera-Tanzi and tax bracket effects of inflation are small, the effect of high 
public debt ratios and low inflation may still have considerable effect. Interest rate moves 
can be exploited to reduce the debt ratio.  
 
But how does interaction matter? We reformulated the model with the cyclical and debt 
variable only, and added inflation and interest rates to the instrumental variables. If these 
variables are explanatory variables, the J-test for overidentifying restrictions on this 
specification should reject the null. This “information set” hypothesis is never rejected 
though. This leaves us with inconclusive evidence on the role of monetary variables. 
 
Another question is whether our labelling of policy interaction is correct. Buti et al. (2001) 
argue that policy substitutability does not necessarily mean that both policies have 
constantly been on conflict course. Both policies can still be relatively tight (or loose). A 
different measure of policy interaction may therefore be needed. A suggestion is to use 
the deviation from the normalised policy instrument. This renders fiscal policy 
autonomous, but does not alter the debt feedback. 
 
4.1.3.  Policy regime shifts 
 
The lack of a debt stabilisation response can be due to incomplete identification of the 
policy reaction. Misspecification arises when responses are not time-invariant. Hence the 
importance of properly accounting for policy regime shifts. This has been mostly 
understood as a once-and-for-all shift in policy behaviour. While this may be true for a 
flexible policy instrument as in monetary policy, it seems much harder to considerably   23
alter the course of policies during a limited term of government. A gradual change in 
policy making, responding to the evolution of the economic structure, seems a more 
realistic description (Blanchard and Simon, 2001). 
 
We check such gradual policy shifts with a simple exercise. Figs. 3 display a rolling 
window of the volatility of the fiscal policy shocks. Window width is set at five years, 
which is equivalent to the official term of government in many countries. It is impossible 
to give a detailed account of all the policy and economic factors that may underlie the 
volatility patterns. Yet, some tendencies are apparent. First, fiscal policy evolves slowly 
over time and some major periods can be discerned. The reduction in volatility is 
particularly pronounced for the EMU-countries since at least the introduction of the  
 Maastricht rules. Its importance should not be overstated though, given the rather low 
average volatilities. Second, there are some clear crisis periods in which volatility 
increases greatly. Germany after Reunification, Italy in the mid-eighties and at the 1997 
EMU-exam, Japan and the United States at the end of the nineties are examples of 
large policy shifts. 
 
This illustrative evidence underlines the importance of policy regime shifts. We will not 
examine gradual shifts, but search endogenously for a single structural break in the 
target policy rule.
31 We apply the sup Quandt - Andrews likelihood ratio test to detect a 
breakdate in the coefficients of the linear target rule. Results are reported in Table 3. 
Structural breaks in fiscal policy are not well documented. We find it hard to detect a 
significant break in the entire target rule. But without exception, a break is associated 
with debt. In Clinton-administered United States, increasing primary surpluses paid off 
debt. The SGP rules had an impact on EU members: the 1992 break usually imposed in 
the literature may not be too far off. In some cases the true policy shift is somewhat 
belated though.
32 The only exceptions are German fiscal policy where the 1974 break is 
related to the strong debt build-up under the Brandt government,
 33 and the pause in 
debt accumulation of Japanese governments in the early eighties. A change in the 
cyclical response of fiscal policy - when significant - does not occur simultaneously with
                                                 
31We disregard changes in the persistence parameter in this way. 
32The breakdate around 1995 for Spain, the Netherlands and Austria is consistent with evidence 
in Fatas and Mihov (2003). 
33I would like to thank Albrecht Ritschl for pointing this out. See Von Hagen (1999) for descriptive 
evidence.   24
Figure 3. Rolling 5-year window of the volatility of the fiscal policy shock. 
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the change in the debt response. But breaks in the interaction term are consistently 
coupled to the break in the debt response. The only exception here is the Netherlands: 
the constraint of the “hard” EMS period bite already in 1985, and cyclical changes 
occurred together with the fiscal EMU rules in 1995.
34 
 
To model the policy shift, we simply plug the breakdate for public debt in the non-linear 
rule with a shift dummy, also allowing the debt response to change. This model does not 
capture a shift in debt reactions. If there is a fiscal regime shift, it must be entirely in a 
rapid consolidation. In particular, in those countries in which the long term surplus ratio 
significantly shifts up, debt responses become weaker afterwards. But if there is a 
substantial loosening, debt responses turn positive. This is evidence of a “stop - go” 
consolidation effort. Gradual shifts in fiscal policy may not be so important after all then. 
This result supports also some of the political economy models of fiscal stabilisations 
(Alesina and Drazen, 1999). It moreover casts some doubt on rules based fiscal policy.
                                                 
34  This evidence suggests fiscal policy drastically alters course under external constraints, 
probably with some bipartisan agreement. The partisan view of fiscal policy does not seem to be 
well supported in the context of fiscal solvency.   27
Table 2. Non-linear fiscal policy rule: GMM-estimates of equation (8). 
baseline rule    rule with policy shift 
United States                     1964-2003 
  coefficient  p-value     coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.23  0.06  ρ  0.03  0.93 
β  0.38  0.02  β  0.28  0.04 
γ  0.33  0.00  γ  0.38  0.00 
ω  -0.12  0.56  ω  0.07  0.68 
θ  0.05  0.08  θ  0.05  0.29 
      dummy θ*   -0.20  0.45 
 
 R
2  0.37   R
2  0.37 
 dw
(a)  0.82   dw  0.62 
 J(4)
 (b)  0.40   J(4)  0.40 
 Jinfo
(c)  0.17  [θ, θ*] = 0  0.56 
 [γ] 
(d)= .50  0.18     
 [β,ω] = 0  0.01     
 [β - ω] = 0  0.15     
 [β,θ] = 0  0.07     
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.22     
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.02     
Japan                     1971-2003 
  coefficient  p-value     coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.65  0.00  ρ  -0.10  0.93 
β  -0.28  0.37  β  1.32  0.17 
γ  1.23  0.00  γ  0.46  0.33 
ω  -0.00  0.99  ω  -0.76  0.21 
θ  -0.07  0.26  θ  -0.18  0.16 
      dummy θ*   0.17  0.45 
 
 R
2  0.78   R
2  0.63 
 dw  0.95   dw  2.04 
 J(4)  0.57   J(4)  0.87 
 Jinfo  0.59  [θ, θ*] = 0  0.00 
 [γ] = .50  0.07     
 [β,ω] = 0  0.66     
 [β - ω] = 0  0.66     
 [β,θ] = 0  0.49     
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.26     
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.14     
Notes: (a) dw is the Durbin-Watson test statistic; (b) J(•) is the J-test for overidentifying 
restrictions; (c) Jinfo tests the null of the interest rate and inflation entering in the rule directly; (d) [•] 
are F-tests on coefficients.   28
baseline rule    rule with policy shift 
Germany                     1966-2003 
  coefficient  p-value     coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.88  0.00  ρ  -0.08  0.82 
β  0.91  0.27  β  0.31  0.05 
γ  0.66  0.55  γ  -0.03  0.80 
ω  -0.60  0.31  ω  -0.60  0.03 
θ  0.46  0.51  θ  4.77  0.29 
      dummy θ*   -4.72  0.30 
 
 R
2  0.10   R
2  0.35 
 dw
(a)  2.10   dw  1.59 
 J(4)
 (b)  0.75   J(4)  0.46 
 Jinfo
(c)  0.52  [θ, θ*] = 0  0.00 
 [γ] 
(d)= .50  0.89     
 [β,ω] = 0  0.95     
 [β - ω] = 0  0.77     
 [β,θ] = 0  0.79     
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.86     
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.90     
       
France                     1978-2003 
  coefficient  p-value     coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.82  0.00  ρ  0.05  0.89 
β  0.94  0.37  β  0.02  0.92 
γ  0.75  0.27  γ  0.19  0.32 
ω  -3.41  0.35  ω  0.33  0.47 
θ  -0.39  0.34  θ  0.44  0.45 
      dummy θ*   -0.25  0.63 
 
 R
2  0.45   R
2  0.45 
 dw  1.56   dw  1.83 
 J(4)  0.54   J(4)  0.72 
 Jinfo  0.50  [θ, θ*] = 0  0.00 
 [γ] = .50  0.71     
 [β,ω] = 0  0.65     
 [β - ω] = 0  0.36     
 [β,θ] = 0  0.63     
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.63     
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.81     
Notes: (a) dw is the Durbin-Watson test statistic; (b) J(•) is the J-test for overidentifying 
restrictions; (c) Jinfo tests the null of the interest rate and inflation entering in the rule directly; (d) [•] 
are F-tests on coefficients. 
   29
baseline rule    rule with policy shift 
Italy                     1971-2003 
  coefficient  p-value     coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.26  0.14  ρ  0.51  0.38 
β  0.40  0.00  β  0.29  0.68 
γ  0.09  0.53  γ  0.87  0.52 
ω  0.07  0.46  ω  -0.84  0.54 
θ  0.19  0.00  θ  -0.22  0.65 
      dummy θ*   0.35  0.45 
         
 R
2  0.89   R
2  0.78 
 dw
(a)  1.37   dw  2.52 
 J(4)
 (b)  0.45   J(4)  0.37 
 Jinfo
(c)  0.89  [θ, θ*] = 0  0.66 
 [γ] 
(d)= .50  0.00     
 [β,ω] = 0  0.00     
 [β - ω] = 0  0.00     
 [β,θ] = 0  0.00     
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.00     
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.00     
United Kingdom                     1979-2003 
  coefficient  p-value     coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.69  0.00  ρ  0.62  0.00 
β  0.11  0.71  β  0.72  0.19 
γ  0.22  0.26  γ  0.27  0.12 
ω  0.29  0.38  ω  -0.27  0.48 
θ  0.87  0.00  θ  0.56  0.03 
      dummy θ*   0.13  0.58 
         
 R
2  0.80   R
2  0.83 
 dw  2.35   dw  2.60 
 J(4)  0.59   J(4)  0.43 
 Jinfo  0.48  [θ, θ*] = 0  0.03 
 [γ] = .50  0.16     
 [β,ω] = 0  0.00     
 [β - ω] = 0  0.78     
 [β,θ] = 0  0.00     
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.00     
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.00     
       
Notes: (a) dw is the Durbin-Watson test statistic; (b) J(•) is the J-test for overidentifying 
restrictions; (c) Jinfo tests the null of the interest rate and inflation entering in the rule directly; (d) [•] 
are F-tests on coefficients.   30
baseline rule    rule with policy shift 
Spain                     1979-2003 
  coefficient  p-value     coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.46  0.15  ρ  0.44  0.39 
β  -2.21  0.13  β  0.62  0.60 
γ  -0.48  0.47  γ  -0.20  0.77 
ω  -0.37  0.27  ω  -1.39  0.13 
θ  -0.42  0.09  θ  -0.14  0.60 
      dummy θ   0.29  0.12 
         
 R
2  0.28   R
2  0.68 
 dw
(a)  1.94   dw  2.86 
 J(4)
 (b)  0.87   J(4)  0.91 
 Jinfo
(c)  0.69  [θ, θ*] = 0  0.17 
 [γ] 
(d)= .50  0.14     
 [β,ω] = 0  0.10     
 [β - ω] = 0  0.24     
 [β,θ] = 0  0.21     
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.13     
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.00     
The Netherlands                     1972-2003 
  coefficient  p-value     coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.11  0.69  ρ  0.18  0.58 
β  0.27  0.00  β  -0.39  0.02 
γ  0.36  0.00  γ  0.13  0.66 
ω  -0.33  0.00  ω  0.36  0.17 
θ  0.04  0.03  θ  0.08  0.22 
      dummy θ*   -0.26  0.64 
         
 R
2  0.50   R
2  0.53 
 dw  1.13   dw  1.77 
 J(4)  0.50   J(4)  0.94 
 Jinfo  0.45  [θ, θ*] = 0  0.13 
 [γ] = .50  0.02     
 [β,ω] = 0  0.00     
 [β - ω] = 0  0.00     
 [β,θ] = 0  0.02     
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.00     
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.00     
       
Notes: (a) dw is the Durbin-Watson test statistic; (b) J(•) is the J-test for overidentifying 
restrictions; (c) Jinfo tests the null of the interest rate and inflation entering in the rule directly; (d) [•] 
are F-tests on coefficients.   31
baseline rule    rule with policy shift 
Austria                     1972-2003 
  coefficient  p-value     coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.35  0.00  ρ  0.55  0.38 
β  0.68  0.00  β  0.21  0.73 
γ  0.37  0.04  γ  -0.39  0.40 
ω  -0.30  0.00  ω  0.86  0.61 
θ  0.07  0.01  θ  0.04  0.84 
      dummy θ*   1.43  0.65 
         
 R
2  0.13   R
2  0.49 
 dw
(a)  1.05   dw  1.31 
 J(4)
 (b)  0.46   J(4)  0.36 
 Jinfo
(c)  0.64  [θ, θ*] = 0  0.58 
 [γ] 
(d)= .50  0.48     
 [β,ω] = 0  0.00     
 [β - ω] = 0  0.00     
 [β,θ] = 0  0.00     
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.00     
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.00     
Notes: (a) dw is the Durbin-Watson test statistic; (b) J(•) is the J-test for overidentifying 
restrictions; (c) Jinfo tests the null of the interest rate and inflation entering in the rule 
directly; (d) [•] are F-tests on coefficients. 
Table 3. Andrews-Quandt breakdates in target fiscal policy rule. 
break in coefficients  United States Japan  Germany  France  Italy 
all   1993  1983 1974 1991  1989 
β  1995** 1977**  1974**  1992*  1985* 
γ  1991  1987 1974 1988  1980 
ω  1992* 1983*  1974  1991  1984* 
θ  1995* 1983*  1974**  1992**  1991* 
residual 
variance 
1997  1989 1998 1992  1990 
break in coefficients  United Kingdom  Spain  The Netherlands  Austria 
all  1990 1985  1990 1976 
β  1998* 1983** 1980  1996 
γ  1990* 1986 1995  1976 
ω  1998** 1995** 1985*  1996** 
θ   1997* 1994*  1995**  1996** 
residual 
variance 
1992 1987  1988 1976 
Note: (a) * indicates significance at 5%, ** at 10%.   32
Even if the SGP has been effective in putting consolidation on the agenda of European 
governments, the rewriting of the procedure once again reflects the consolidation 
fatigue.
35  Nevertheless, there is no strong evidence of a trade-off between debt and 
output stabilisation. This was already suggested by the diverse breakdates. In contrast to 
Artis and Buti (2001), we find that output responses turn acyclical after Maastricht, but 
only in those countries where the initial fiscal outlook was unfavourable already (Austria 
and the Netherlands). A model with the dummy on the cyclical response confirms this 
trade-off (results not reported). With respect to policy interaction, there is no significant 
evidence of non-autonomous fiscal policy anymore. 
 
There are three important caveats to this interpretation. First, only modelling the shift in 
public debt understates the importance of policy interaction. The simultaneous breakdate 
on the interaction term suggests that a more complete model of the regime shift is 
needed. Experiments with a shift dummy on the interaction term do not provide a better 
model though (results not reported). Second, the inclusion of a dummy is a too coarse 
way to model policy shifts. In particular, we disregarded breaks in the persistence 
parameter of the non-linear rule. It may well be that debt consolidations come about by a 
sudden rapid adjustment to the target level of primary surplus. Third, the “stop - go” 
consolidations that leave systematic fiscal policy reactions unchanged, may just reflect 
that a few large swings in public debt provide insufficient identifying restrictions. 
 
4.2. Robustness analysis 
 
It can be argued that the empirical rule does not completely correspond to the theoretical 
model. Indeed, the diversity of fiscal policy models - which reflects the heterogeneity of 
policy instruments and targets - suggests many extensions. We check the robustness of 
the results against some different data measures and specifications. Results are in Table 
4. 
 
4.2.1. Systematic  discretionary  policy 
 
                                                 
35 The positive news is that the deficit rule could be replaced with a debt rule. Legislated rules 
may indeed be a necessary condition for stable systematic sustainability responses (see Section 
4.2).   33
As in Galí and Perotti (2003), we would like to assess cyclical properties of discretionary 
policy apart from the constructed automatic stabilisers. The true instrument of fiscal 
policy makers is then considered to be the (budgeted) structural surplus ratio. So far, we 
remained agnostic about the use of filters and analysed the actual indicator s directly. 




The cyclical response obviously decreases, and in theory, this ratio should be acyclical. 
The procyclical tendency of European fiscal policies is clearly demonstrated though, and 
particularly so in Italy and Austria. That the debt response for Austria and the 
Netherlands turns insignificant proves that there is some trade-off with cyclical 
stabilisation in these countries.  
 
4.2.2.  Debt stabilisation revisited 
 
Political economy models of public debt argue that debt stabilisation is not a smooth 
process. Only when fiscal conditions worsen beyond some sustainable level, does debt 
arrive on the politician’s agenda. Even with a non-linear specification, these sudden 
“urgencies” are hard to detect empirically.
37We therefore specify a target rule that is non-
linear in the debt measure. 
 
This may still be an incomplete characterisation of debt reduction though. While there 
usually is a period of linear debt accumulation (or non-response) of the primary surplus, 
it is not offset by the sudden consolidation reaction. Even if this small reaction is 
important in absolute terms, the result once more underlines the “stop-go” consolidation 
property of fiscal policy.
38  Policy behaviour out of these crisis periods barely alters. 
Incorporating fiscal rules into legislation may help to establish smoother reactions, as the 
positive linear reaction coefficients for the United Kingdom and the Netherlands suggest. 
                                                 
36This under the caveat that estimation on filtered variables may merely capture the filter 
properties. 
37 The lack of a positive feedback on debt over the sample period may have another interpretation. 
With a non-linear rule, a positive response may not be present if debt never exceeded some 
threshold value after which the reaction coefficient is bounded away from zero. Only model-based 
evidence could shed light on this. The missing feedback may thus be a consequence of 
insufficient identification in the dataset. 
38 This supports the modelling of the policy change in Section 4.1.   34
 
4.2.3.  Output gap measures 
 
The use of a mechanically calculated output gap is debatable in an empirical 
examination of a theoretical relationship that derives from a New Keynesian model. As in 
the targeting rule of Benigno and Woodford (2003) such a theoretical gap is present, we 
follow Galí et al. (2001) to substitute the gap with a measure of real marginal cost i.e. the 
(log deviation of) real unit labour cost. 
 
There is actually a close inverse correspondence between this theory-based gap and the 
surplus ratio for the non-European countries. It thus results in a significant 
countercyclical surplus response, even in Germany and Austria. For the other EMS 
countries, acyclicality is confirmed. If anything, debt stabilisation is not as strong as in 
the baseline model. We rather find a significant destabilising response for Japan and 
Germany. On all other accounts, this model performs rather well: inflation and the 
interest rate are never rejected as elements of the rule, even if they may rather belong to 
the information set. Fiscal policy is a non-autonomous complement to monetary policy in 
Japan, the United Kingdom and Austria, but a substitute in the Netherlands and Spain. 
 
4.2.4.  Tax and spending rules 
 
The surplus ratio is a rest category that hides much of the information on the 
composition of the fiscal policy instrument. Theoretical models usually take the level of 
government spending as given, and define tax rules that determine the future sequence 
of primary surpluses. We want to exploit the extra information in both expenditure and 
revenues to assess fiscal solvency, and specify a tax and spending rule with the same 
basic specification as in (8).
39  This is still a gross simplification as distortionary tax 
effects operate differently across tax categories.
40   But this summary specification 
corresponds closely to the rule in Benigno and Woodford (2003). 
 
When there is a significant stabilising response to debt in the baseline model, then this is
                                                 
39  The fiscal indicator is replaced with the ratio of gross revenues or primary government 
expenditure, to potential output. 
40 See Lane (2003) for such evidence.   35
Table 4. Non-linear fiscal policy rule: GMM-estimates of equation (8). 
  marginal cost gap  squared debt ratio  tax-rule  spending rule 
United States 
  coefficient  p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.35  0.14  0.49  0.01  0.56  0.00  0.95  0.00 
β  0.88  0.00  -1.32  0.15  0.19  0.30  0.82  0.69 
γ  -1.94  0.04  1.39  0.02  0.39  0.00  -1.87  0.56 
ω  0.16  0.60  0.83  0.08  -0.18  0.44  -0.72  0.73 
θ  -0.07  0.35  -4.40  0.11  0.08  0.01  0.17  0.72 
      θ
2=0.04 0.10         
R
2  0.66 0.48 0.75 0.91 
dw
(a)  0.97 1.16 1.40 1.26 
J(4)
 (b)  0.83 0.65 0.39 0.39 
 Jinfo
(c)  0.30 0.20 0.23 0.45 
 [γ] 
(d)= .50  0.01 0.15 0.45 0.46 
 [β,ω] = 0  0.03 0.22 0.58 0.93 
 [β – ω] = 0  0.04 0.12 0.33 0.70 
 [β,θ] = 0  0.03 0.26 0.04 0.92 
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.61 0.21 0.03 0.92 
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.08 0.13 0.01 0.98 
Japan 
  coefficient  p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.36  0.07  0.67  0.00  0.64  0.00  0.88  0.00 
β  -0.64  0.00  -0.39  0.39  -0.24  0.04  -0.72  0.47 
γ  -1.03  0.00  1.64  0.03  1.00  0.00  -1.83  0.49 
ω  0.60  0.01  -0.18  0.74  0.58  0.00  0.31  0.70 
θ  -0.06  0.01  -0.20  0.26  0.08  0.00  -0.04  0.85 
      θ
2=0.00 0.52         
R
2  0.73 0.71 0.94 0.89 
dw  1.51 0.99 1.81 1.15 
J(4)  0.72 0.55 0.66 0.84 
 Jinfo  0.67 0.54 0.65 0.71 
 [γ] = .50  0.00 0.14 0.00 0.38 
 [β,ω] = 0  0.01 0.57 0.00 0.68 
 [β – ω] = 0  0.00 0.79 0.00 0.38 
 [β,θ] = 0  0.00 0.51 0.00 0.43 
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.00 0.26 0.00 0.83 
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.00 0.69 0.00 0.15 
 
Notes: (a) dw is the Durbin-Watson test statistic; (b) J(•) is the J-test for overidentifying 
restrictions; (c) Jinfo tests the null of the interest rate and inflation entering in the rule directly; (d) [•] 
are F-tests on coefficients.   36
  marginal cost gap  squared debt ratio  tax-rule  spending rule 
Germany 
  coefficient  p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient  p-value 
ρ  -0.13  0.75  0.90  0.00  0.73  0.00  0.76  0.00 
β  -0.40  0.02  0.26  0.95  1.41  0.18  0.32  0.39 
γ  0.22  0.00  -0.93  0.98  0.65  0.22  0.54  0.08 
ω  0.09  0.58  0.09  0.97  -0.95  0.27  -0.29  0.22 
θ  -0.03  0.04  -0.79  0.71  0.30  0.11  0.02  0.84 
      θ
2=0.01 0.69         
R
2  0.24 0.11 0.37 0.70 
dw
(a)  1.28 2.01 1.67 1.29 
J(4)
 (b)  0.37 0.75 0.64 0.33 
 Jinfo
©  0.80 0.62 0.62 0.71 
 [γ] 
(d)= .50  0.00 0.67 0.78 0.90 
 [β,ω] = 0  0.00 0.98 0.28 0.45 
 [β – ω] = 0  0.13 0.98 0.21 0.29 
 [β,θ] = 0  0.06 0.93 0.28 0.68 
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.12 0.93 0.21 0.47 
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.00 0.98 0.62 0.66 
France 
  coefficient  p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.90  0.00  0.71  0.06  0.77
(e)  0.15  1.07
(e)  0.15 
β  2.30  0.54  0.56  0.57  -0.83  0.61  0.48  0.86 
γ  -1.48  0.54  0.80  0.10  -1.01  0.75  0.60  0.79 
ω  -5.54  0.55  -2.19  0.43  -0.32  0.90  -2.33  0.80 
θ  -0.77  0.54  -1.37  0.17  -0.25  0.80  0.30  0.74 
      θ
2=0.01 0.17         
R
2  0.41 0.33 0.34 0.87 
dw  1.53 1.31 2.03 2.52 
J(4)  0.58 0.55 0.51 0.02 
 Jinfo  0.53 0.58 0.62 0.21 
 [γ] = .50  0.42 0.54 0.63 0.96 
 [β,ω] = 0  0.82 0.62 0.87 0.63 
 [β – ω] = 0  0.55 0.45 0.83 0.81 
 [β,θ] = 0  0.83 0.38 0.85 0.63 
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.83 0.37 0.95 0.90 
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.94 0.38 0.35 0.59 
 
Notes: (a) dw is the Durbin-Watson test statistic; (b) J(•) is the J-test for overidentifying 
restrictions; (c) Jinfo tests the null of the interest rate and inflation entering in the rule directly; (d) [•] 
are F-tests on coefficients; (e) three smoothing lags on this rule are needed. 
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  marginal cost gap  squared debt ratio  tax-rule  spending rule 
Italy 
  coefficient  p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.31  0.05  0.43  0.00  0.62  0.00  0.53  0.00 
β  0.47  0.00  -0.06  0.85  -0.40  0.00  -0.46  0.00 
γ  0.04  0.58  0.64  0.06  0.96  0.00  0.41  0.00 
ω  0.16  0.17  0.76  0.04  0.15  0.49  0.40  0.00 
θ  0.20  0.00  -0.64  0.07  0.12  0.00  -0.04  0.05 
      θ
2=0.00 0.02         
R
2  0.89 0.83 0.95 0.79 
dw
(a)  1.42 1.63 2.33 2.60 
J(4)
 (b)  0.52 0.56 0.66 0.77 
 Jinfo
©  0.81 0.94 0.87 0.65 
 [γ] 
(d)= .50  0.00 0.68 0.06 0.34 
 [β,ω] = 0  0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 
 [β – ω] = 0  0.01 0.18 0.01 0.00 
 [β,θ] = 0  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
United Kingdom 
  coefficient  p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.75  0.00  0.72  0.00  0.86  0.00  0.91  0.00 
β  -0.30  0.53  0.22  0.53  0.22  0.74  0.12  0.79 
γ  -0.56  0.40  0.08  0.74  -0.20  0.51  -1.34  0.04 
ω  1.03  0.00  0.19  0.59  0.41  0.47  -0.79  0.48 
θ  0.90  0.00  0.20  0.94  1.15  0.11  -0.89  0.28 
      θ
2=0.01 0.77         
R
2  0.67 0.78 0.82 0.96 
dw  1.69 2.48 2.25 2.10 
J(4)  0.52 0.52 0.72 0.77 
 Jinfo  0.56 0.56 0.67 0.83 
 [γ] = .50  0.11 0.06 0.02 0.00 
 [β,ω] = 0  0.00 0.02 0.03 0.69 
 [β – ω] = 0  0.03 0.97 0.87 0.54 
 [β,θ] = 0  0.00 0.82 0.11 0.54 
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.00 0.87 0.07 0.51 
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.00 0.05 0.06 0.64 
 
Notes: (a) dw is the Durbin-Watson test statistic; (b) J(•) is the J-test for overidentifying 
restrictions; (c) Jinfo tests the null of the interest rate and inflation entering in the rule directly; (d) [•] 
are F-tests on coefficients. 
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  marginal cost gap  squared debt ratio  tax-rule  spending rule 
Spain 
  coefficient  p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.26  0.61  0.08  0.80  0.38  0.00  0.63  0.00 
β  -1.20  0.00  -1.27  0.01  -0.71  0.00  0.94  0.01 
γ  0.08  0.34  -0.02  0.92  0.57  0.00  1.25  0.00 
ω  -0.40  0.05  -0.23  0.22  0.05  0.65  0.12  0.51 
θ  -0.25  0.00  -0.38  0.00  -0.02  0.56  0.24  0.03 
      θ
2=0.00 0.05         
R
2  0.06 0.53 0.96 0.90 
dw
(a)  1.60 2.20 2.77 1.85 
J(4)
 (b)  0.95 0.96 0.64 0.67 
 Jinfo
©  0.74 0.75 0.66 0.71 
 [γ] 
(d)= .50  0.00 0.02 0.20 0.00 
 [β,ω] = 0  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 [β – ω] = 0  0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 
 [β,θ] = 0  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
The Netherlands 
  coefficient  p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.71  0.00  -0.24  0.35  0.31
(e)  0.00  0.70
(e)  0.10 
β  -0.87  0.31  0.45  0.00  -0.22  0.21  -0.90  0.09 
γ  -0.76  0.21  0.58  0.00  0.18  0.25  -0.34  0.03 
ω  -0.59  0.04  -0.31  0.00  0.16  0.16  0.81  0.03 
θ  -0.41  0.22  0.65  0.02  0.04  0.18  -0.06  0.61 
      θ
2=-0.00 0.03         
R
2  0.36 0.15 0.45 0.89 
dw  1.31 1.06 2.82 1.80 
J(4)  0.39 0.67 0.67 0.65 
 Jinfo  0.45 0.55 0.87 0.36 
 [γ] = .50  0.00 0.48 0.04 0.00 
 [β,ω] = 0  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 
 [β – ω] = 0  0.54 0.00 0.01 0.05 
 [β,θ] = 0  0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.03 0.00 0.29 0.00 
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Notes: (a) dw is the Durbin-Watson test statistic; (b) J(•) is the J-test for overidentifying 
restrictions; (c) Jinfo tests the null of the interest rate and inflation entering in the rule directly; (d) [•] 
are F-tests on coefficients; (e) two smoothing lags on this rule are needed. 
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  marginal cost gap  squared debt ratio  tax-rule  spending rule 
Austria 
  coefficient  p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient  p-value 
ρ  0.21  0.26  0.31  0.31  0.48  0.00  0.71  0.00 
β  0.06  0.75  -0.47  0.26  -0.04  0.91  -0.72  0.00 
γ  -0.28  0.00  -1.19  0.02  0.72  0.07  -0.38  0.21 
ω  0.22  0.03  1.28  0.00  0.02  0.90  -0.02  0.95 
θ  0.01  0.70  -1.10  0.00  0.13  0.00  -0.19  0.00 
      θ
2=0.01 0.00         
R
2  0.36 0.32 0.89 0.65 
dw
(a)  1.31 1.77 1.24 0.95 
J(4)
 (b)  0.39 0.87 0.71 0.48 
 Jinfo
(c)  0.45 0.67 0.95 0.45 
 [γ] 
(d)= .50  0.00 0.00 0.58 0.00 
 [β,ω] = 0  0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 
 [β - ω] = 0  0.54 0.03 0.89 0.13 
 [β,θ] = 0  0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 [ω,θ] = 0  0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 
 [β,ω,θ] = 0  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: (a) dw is the Durbin-Watson test statistic; (b) J(•) is the J-test for overidentifying 
restrictions; (c) Jinfo tests the null of the interest rate and inflation entering in the rule directly; (d) [•] 
are F-tests on coefficients. 
 
mostly brought about by tax increases. Decreases in spending are rather rare or 
insignificant. Italy and Austria are clear examples of debt stabilisations taking place on 
the two sides of the budget. When initial fiscal conditions are dreadful, consolidation 
probably needs to occur on both government revenues and expenditures. With well-
behaved policymaking, there is probably less urgency to cut expenses drastically. The 
reluctance to reduce government expenditure is also obvious in the cyclical responses. 
Revenues stream in during cyclical upswings, and are spent immediately. This explains 
the procyclicality of European fiscal policies. Such an effect is absent in the United 
States or the Netherlands for example.  
 
The distinction between revenues and expenditures allows us to consider some 
alternative hypotheses on the effect of inflation and interest rates. The positive 
responses to inflation are mostly explained for by spending cuts that are more than offset 
by the revenue shortfall. Non-indexation of expenditure categories may thus be more 
important in containing government expansion than creeping tax-bracket effects. That 
interest rates are an important determinant of tax revenues is not a hypothesis that can   40
be maintained, as responses are hardly significant. Nor do higher rates seem to induce 
compensation for higher interest payments in expenditures. Overall, in the tax and 
spending rules, the joint effects of inflation and interest rates are hard to accept. Of 




The problematic fiscal policy experiences of recent years have fuelled vivid academic 
and policy discussions on the sustainability of fiscal policies. This debate is nowadays 
cast in terms of policy rules, and focuses also on the policy mix between fiscal and 
monetary policies. Debt is the nexus of interaction between both. Despite these recent 
advances, the incorporation of both fiscal and monetary policy in an empirical analysis of 
systematic policy behaviour is currently missing. 
 
The aim of this paper is to characterise rules-based fiscal policy as a means of testing 
fiscal sustainability. The main contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we derive 
from theory a testable specification that we then identify as a fiscal rule. Second, we 
perform a comparative cross-country analysis of fiscal rules on annual OECD data. 
 
The examination of rules based policy leads us to two main conclusions on fiscal 
sustainability. First, as a rule, there is a significant stabilising reaction to debt. Taking into 
account interaction with monetary policy importantly accounts for the success of the 
model. The exceptions to the rule are Germany, France and Japan, for which the model 
is not able to reject insolvency. Second, there are regime shifts in fiscal policy that are 
mainly related to debt. The effect of the Maastricht rules in Europe and the Clinton 
administration made consolidation become a major policy concern over the last decade. 
This occurred without important effects on other policy parameters. That is, consolidation 
follows a “stop - go” cycle and does not get incorporated into systematic policy reactions. 
Consolidation did not really impede cylical stabilisation. The effect of monetary union on 
fiscal policy setting is not negligible. In small EMS countries, fiscal policies are a 
substitute to monetary policy, and inflation becomes an important policy objective. 
 
The limitations of the current analysis are obvious, but need qualification. First, the 
GMM-methodology corrects the estimates for the endogeneity of fiscal policy. It may be   41
less successful in capturing systematic monetary policy. However, it is a first step in 
controlling for the policy mix. Second, debt is hard to model as a few large oscillations in 
the process hamper identification. On all accounts, the model we use to test 
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